Books

2007, a philosophy monograph, Incommensurability and Cross-Language Communication, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, England, pp. 374, included in Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Philosophy Series.

Click here to read the Cover Pages, Table of Contents, First Chapter, and Index.

 

2009, Symbolic Logic Study Guide, University Readers, pp. 110

 

Articles

Forthcoming, “The Propositional vs. Hermeneutic Models of Cross-Cultural Understanding,” South African Journal of Philosophy

Abstract: What the author attempts to address in this paper is a Kantian question: not whether, but how is cross-cultural understanding possible? And specifically, what is a more effective approach for cross-cultural understanding? The answer lies in an analysis of two different models of cross-cultural understanding, that is, propositional and hermeneutic understanding. To begin with, the author presents a linguistic interpretation of culture, i.e., a culture as a linguistically formulated and transmitted symbolic system with its conceptual core as a scheme of basic cultural presuppositions, which it referred to as a cultural language. After exploring the essential role of cultural presuppositions in cross-cultural understanding, the author discusses the traditional model of cross-cultural understanding, namely, the propositional model. Through critically examining the two popular versions of the propositional model, i.e., the projective approach and the adoptive approach to cross-cultural understanding, it is found that cross-cultural propositional understanding is doomed to failure. To move us beyond the absolutism-relativism trap embedded within propositional understanding, the author first introduces and discusses Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic understanding, and then applies Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic model of understanding to cross-cultural understanding. It is finally concluded that cross-cultural understanding is essentially hermeneutic—including the case of cultural learning, not propositional. Therefore, cross-cultural understanding is hermeneutically possible. 

Forthcoming, “Alternative Conceptual Schemes and a Non-Kantian Scheme-Content Dualism,” in Proceedings of 22nd World Congress of Philosophy (August, 2008, Seoul, Korea)

Abstract: D. Davidson argues that the existence of alternative conceptual schemes presupposes the Kantian scheme-content dualism, which requires a scheme-neutral empirical content and a fixed, sharp scheme-content distinction. The dismantlement of such a Kantian scheme-content dualism, which Davidson calls “the third dogma of empiricism”, would render the notion of alternative conceptual schemes groundless. To counter Davidson’s attack on the notion of alternative conceptual schemes, I argue that alternative conceptual schemes neither entail nor presuppose the Kantian scheme-content dualism. On the contrary, it is exactly the abandonment of the concept-neutral content and the denial of a fixed, absolute scheme-content distinction that turns the Kantian conceptual absolutism upside down and thus makes alternative conceptual schemes possible. Proposing common-sense experience as the empirical content of alternative schemes, I construct and defend a non-Kantian scheme-content dualism based on a non-fixed, relative scheme-content distinction. The proposed non-Kantian scheme-content dualism is not only “innocent” enough to be immune from Davidson’s charge of the third dogma of empiricism, but also “solid” enough to be able to sustain alternative conceptual schemes. I conclude that in terms of our conceptual schemes, we are connected to the world as closely as possible; only through conceptual schemes can we be connected to the world.

2009, “On Davidson’s Refutation of Conceptual Schemes and Conceptual Relativism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 90 (1): 140-164

Abstract: Despite D. Davidson’s influential criticism of the very notion of conceptual schemes, the notion continues enjoying its popularity in contemporary philosophy and, accordingly, conceptual relativism is still very much alive. There is one major reason responsible for Davidson’s failure which has not been widely recognized: What Davidson attacks fiercely is not the very notion, but a notion of conceptual schemes, namely, the Quinean notion of conceptual schemes and its underlying Kantian scheme-content dualism. However, such a notion simply cannot carry the weight of conceptual relativism for it does not catch the essences of conceptual relativism. Consequently, I argue that the very notion of conceptual schemes and conceptual relativism have survived Davidson’s attack. Therefore, the failure of the Quinean notion of conceptual schemes and Kantian scheme-content dualism, even if Davidson can claim victory, does not mark the end of the very notion of conceptual schemes.

2009, “Linguistic Communication versus Understanding,” Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 38 (1): 71-84

Abstract: It is a common wisdom that linguistic communication is different from linguistic understanding. However, the distinction between communication and understanding is not as clear as it seems to be. It is argued that the relationship between linguistic communication and understanding depends upon the notions of understanding and communication involved. Thinking along the line of propositional understanding and informative communication, communication can be reduced to mutual understanding. In contrast, operating along the line of hermeneutic understanding and dialogical communication, the process of understanding is in essence a process of communication. However, dialogical communication should not be confused with (mutual) propositional understanding. Conversely, hermeneutic understanding should not be confused with informative communication either. The former is dialogical in nature while the latter is monological.

2008, “Epistemology,” Series on Western Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences, Philosophy Volume, editors, Jiyuan Yu & Zhewei Zhang, Renmin University Press, Beijing, China, pp. 1-47

2007, “Conceptual Schemes and Presuppositional Languages,”  in The Proceedings of the 21st World Congress of Philosophy, Istanbul, 2003, Volume 6 (Epistemology), editors, Stephen Voss and Dermot Moran, by Philosophy Society of Turkey, Ankara, pp. 119-124 . [The Proceedings contain the best papers presented at this Congress, which are selected by the editor of each volume, published in thirteen thematically organized hardbound volumes.]

2004, "Where Are Facts? -- A Case For Internal Factual Realism," Dialogos 82: 7-30

Abstract: What is the ontological status of facts?  Are facts linguistic or extra-linguistic entities?  If facts are extra-linguistic entities, are they mind-independent or relative to languages, theories or conceptual schemes?  Based on a minimal definition of facts, the author argues that what are specified by true statements are not identical to true propositions expressed, so facts are not linguistic entities.  Furthermore, what are specified by true statements are not to which a true statement corresponds, so facts are not mind-independent, either as concrete entities in the universe or as abstract entities in the world as it is.  Last, the author presents an internal factual realist answer: although facts are neither in the world as it is, nor in a language, facts are real and exist in a world under consideration.  A fact, as a non-linguistic correlate of a true statement of a language, exists in a world specified by the language.   

2003, "Presuppositional Languages and the Failure of Cross-Language Understanding,” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, Vol. 42 (1): 53-77 (online access via Cambridge Journals Online)

Abstract: Why is mutual understanding between two substantially different comprehensive language communities often problematic and even unattainable? To answer this question, the author first introduces a notion of presuppositional languages. Based on the semantic structure of a presuppositional language, the author identifies a significant condition necessary for effective understanding of a language: the interpreter is able to effectively understand a language only if he/she is able to recognize and comprehend its metaphysical presuppositions. The essential role of the knowledge of metaphysical presuppositions in understanding is further strengthened by developing a truth-value conditional theory of understanding. It is concluded that if the interpreter approaches an incompatible alien language from the standpoint of the interpreter's own language by projecting the metaphysical presuppositions of his/her own language upon the alien language, then the mutual understanding between the two language communities is doomed to failure.

2002, "Taxonomy, Truth-Value Gaps and Incommensurability: A Reconstruction of T. Kuhn's Taxonomic Interpretation of Incommensurability," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33(3)： 465-485

Abstract: Kuhn's alleged taxonomic interpretation of incommensurability is grounded on an ill-defined notion of untranslatability and is hence radically incomplete. To supplement it, The author gives a different reading of Kuhn's taxonomic interpretation of incommensurability based on a combination of a logical-semantic theory of taxonomy, a semantic theory of truth-value, and a semantic theory of cross-language communication. According to such a reconstruction, two scientific languages are incommensurable when core sentences of one language, which have truth-values when considered within its own context, lack truth-values when considered within the context of the other due to the unmatchable taxonomic structures underlying them.

Click here for a version of Chinese translation (in word).

2001, "Hume Is Not A Skeptic About Induction," Dialogos 78: 41-54. 

Abstract: On the basis of the distinction between logical and factual probability, epistemic justification is distinguished from logical justification of induction. It is argued that, contrary to the accepted interpretation of Hume, Hume believes that inductive inferences are epistemically legitimate and justifiable. Hence the beliefs arrived at via (correct) inductive inferences are rational beliefs. According to this interpretation, Hume is not a radical skeptic about induction.

1999, "Is the Notion of Semantic Presupposition Empty?" Dialogos 73: 61-91.  

Abstract: This paper is an attempt to clarify the notion of semantic presupposition and to refute Böer and Lycan's critique of that notion. The author presents a feasible and coherent formal definition of semantic presupposition after examining several popular definitions of the notion. In terms of this definition, two central arguments against semantic presupposition presented by Böer and Lycan are analyzed and responded to with care. It is concluded that the notion of semantic presupposition is not empty but rather is philosophically interesting and fruitful.

A Chinese version of the above paper is included in Contemporary Inquiries Into the Foundational Issues of Philosophy, the Commercial Press, Beijing, China, 2002, pp. 190-224.

1998, "A Critique of the Translational Approach to Incommensurability," Prima Philosophia 11 (3): 293-306. 

Abstract: According to the received translational interpretation of incommensurability, incommensurability is viewed as untranslatability due to radical variance of meaning or reference of the terms in two competing scientific languages. The author argues that the translational approach to incommensurability does not effectively clarify the concept of incommensurability. Since it cannot provide us with tenable, integrated concept of incommensurability, it should be rejected.